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SUMMARY
On 20 November 2018, BICC hosted an international academic conference 
entitled “Stabilisation—For Whom and to What Ends?” in Bonn. The 
conference brought together a good 80 participants, academics and 
practitioners from around the world, to exchange research insights and 
discuss their understanding of ‘stabilisation’. 
‘Stabilisation’ is becoming increasingly important as a policy paradigm 
in international security and development policy. However, different 
approaches to stabilisation are discussed in academia, policy and practice. 
Often, there is a tension between short-term approaches to stabilisation 
that are dominated by concerns for security and the establishment or 
maintenance of order and more long-term perspectives which seek to 
transform the underlying structures, e.g. with regard to democracy, peace 
and human rights. BICC’s international scientific conference reflected 
this controversy. The lively and engaged exchange of the participants was 
enhanced by the highly interactive, participatory format of the conference. 
The leading questions of the conference, introduced by Esther 
Meininghaus, Katja Mielke and Max Mutschler, formed the basis for the 
discussions of the day: a) What is our understanding of stabilisation?  
b) How does stabilisation work in practice? c) Does the growing 
significance of stabilisation imply abandoning support for democracy and 
human rights, focusing instead on the establishment and maintenance of 
order? In three parallel topical groups, the participants shared their views 
on three core themes related to stabilisation: “Peacekeeping and Military 
Intervention”, “Train and Equip Programmes and Security Sector Reform” 
and “Migration Management and Humanitarian and Development Aid”. 
Three parallel discussion groups on Iraq, Syria and Mali also followed these 
questions. Additionally, the participants were invited to discuss the results 
of these breakout groups in a ‘market place’ and in plenary sessions. 
The conference was generously funded by the Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung  
(DSF, German Foundation for Peace Research) and the Foundation for International Dialogue  
of the Savings Bank in Bonn.
Figure cover: At the beginning of the conference, the organisers asked the participants to vote by mobil phone in a poll  
expressing their perception of “stabilisation”. At the end, having been asked to vote again, the result was different.
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Esther Meininghaus, Katja Mielke and Max Mutschler (f. l. t. r.) \ opening the conference
Stabilisation: Positive, negative, or neutral?
To open the conference “Stabilisation—For Whom and to What Ends?”,  
the three organisers, Esther Meininghaus, Katja Mielke and Max Mutschler 
presented and discussed the central themes and guiding questions which,  
focussing on stabilisation as a policy paradigm in international security and 
development, would lead all participants through the day. 
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Is your perception of stabilisation a) positive, b) nega-
tive, or c) neutral? The organisers posed this question 
to all participants in a poll at the very beginning. 
The result was quite mixed and showed that there 
was no clear-cut winner, even though 37,5 per cent 
voted positive, while 27 per cent voted negative and 
35 per cent neutral. Several participants explained 
their votes, which pointed toward some of the central 
themes that would emerge during the conference. 
For example, while proponents of a positive view of 
stabilisation saw it as a pragmatic approach to reduc-
ing violence, sceptics referred to a dangerous overem-
phasis on security, order and authority inherent in 
the concept of stabilisation. 
As noted by the organisers, it is this tension that 
requires further discussion now that stabilisa-
tion is regaining currency as a policy paradigm in 
international security, foreign and development 
policy. So-called stabilisation efforts are directed 
particularly at regions that witness violent conflict 
or that are perceived to be at risk thereof. Under the 
umbrella of “stabilisation programmes”, we find 
measures as diverse as direct military interventions, 
train-and-equip programmes for security forces, as 
well as development and humanitarian aid pro-
grammes. 
Meininghaus, Mielke and Mutschler introduced 
several definitions of stabilisation from various 
policy documents by key actors in this field to illus-
trate the extent to which these differ both between 
actors and over time. For example, an early US defini-
tion of stabilisation from 2010 stressed the ambition 
of building sustainable peace and government insti-
tutions able to promote development and protect 
human rights (among other things).1 In contrast, the 
2018 US definition of stabilisation is primarily about 
supporting locally legitimate authorities in
1  US Department of State/USAID (2010): Leading Through 
Civilian Power. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review; available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/153108.pdf; p. xiii.
managing conflict and preventing violence—with 
no reference to further norms like human rights.2 
Similarly, Germany’s conceptualisation of stabilisa-
tion from 2017 is open not only towards support for 
government institutions but also for effective non- 
governmental partners. It acknowledges explicitly 
that ‘circumstances may compel us to temporarily 
accept political orders which are not entirely com-
patible with our own values’.3 The organisers also 
showed that, indeed, the European Union and United 
Nations implement programmes under the heading 
of ‘stabilisation’ at a significant scale, but without 
reference to any clear definition of what this entails.
2  US Department of State/USAID/US Department of Defense 
(2018): A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of 
U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas. 
Stabilization Assistance Review; available at:  
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283589.pdf; p. 1.
3  Federal Government of Germany (2017): Guidelines on Preventing 
Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace; available at: https://
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/1214246/057f794cd3593763ea55
6897972574fd/preventing-crises-data.pdf; p. 52.
Conrad Schetter \ welcomed the participants
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This overview on the conceptual evolution of stabi-
lisation provided the basis for the introduction of 
three bundles of guiding questions for the confer-
ence: 
1 \ What is our understanding of stabilisation? 
Who or what is meant to be stabilised, and 
to what ends? With national ministries, 
multilateral organisations and transnational 
NGOs employing a range of differing, often 
conflicting, understandings of stabilisation, 
the first central question was whether there is 
a shared core that allows us to speak of the/a 
concept or paradigm of stabilisation in the 
first place or whether it is only a new label for 
measures that have always been applied in 
conflict contexts. 
Max Mutschler \ gave an overview on the guiding questions of the  
conference
“What is your perception of stabilisation?”  \ Participants polling at the very beginning of the conference
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2 \ How does stabilisation work in practice? 
What are the concrete means and practices 
of stabilisation? Guided by these questions, 
the conference participants explored the 
potential benefits and risks resulting from 
stabilisation policies for donors, local partners 
and local populations. What are the lessons 
learned from various regional and thematic 
contexts? Are there conflicts between short- 
to medium-term measures of stabilisation 
and the long-term goal of stability? And if so, 
how can we deal with them?
3 \ Does the growing significance of stabilisa-
tion imply abandoning support for democ-
racy and human rights, instead focusing 
on the establishment and maintenance of 
order? In other words, has the turn towards 
stabilisation resulted from failed attempts 
at holding onto the normative concept of 
liberal peacebuilding or are the two concepts 
complementary? Proponents of stabilisation 
often imply that a liberal peace (i.e. democ-
racy, human rights and free markets) is the 
central objective of stabilisation, at least in 
the long run. On the other hand, one can 
argue that social change—as an important 
condition for achieving peace in post-conflict 
countries—requires transformation across the 
different levels of society. And stabilisation, 
with its focus on the establishment of order 
and control, does not allow for such transfor-
mations; thereby eroding the central idea of 
the liberal peace paradigm. 
As Meininghaus, Mielke and Mutschler pointed 
out, this last question in particular illustrates that 
besides the academic interest, this exploration of the 
concept, means and practices of stabilisation has an 
important ethical dimension, too. 
Before the breakout groups \ Plenary session reflecting the conference's guiding questions
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Stabilisation is no panacea in peacekeeping 
For the breakout group “Peacekeeping missions and military intervention”, Peter 
Rudolf, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Ann L. Phillips,  
Civilian-Military Relations Program at the United States Institute of Peace and 
Larry Attree, Saferworld, introduced their perspectives on the relationship between 
stabilisation and peacebuilding, on who benefits from stabilisation measures  
and the involved risks in stabilisation operations. 
Ann L. Phillips and Peter Rudolf (1st and 2nd f. l.) \ were input-givers in the breakout group “Peacekeeping missions and military intervention”
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 1 \ 2019 9 \
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lisation is a part. As to the US government’s intera-
gency Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), Phillips 
pointed to the ongoing challenges to implementa-
tion of its findings and recommendations. 
Larry Attree scrutinised the intended end of stabi-
lisation as part of peacebuilding. According to him, 
stabilisation success should be judged against aims 
such as reducing violence, respect for human rights, 
ensuring access to justice, good livelihood opportu-
nities and civic participation. In practice, Attree, too, 
sees a bias in how stabilisation is conceptualised 
and understood predominantly from a “Western” or 
interventionist perspective motivated by external 
concerns (e.g. regarding migrants or terrorism). He 
furthermore called for a more nuanced understand-
ing of stabilisation with lower expectations that 
take into account the various trade-offs among the 
involved actors that need to be accepted.
In the subsequent discussion, it was outlined that 
many drivers of conflicts are neglected in stabili-
sation mandates and their practical enforcement 
because conflict causes are not addressed. Instead, 
groups are labelled as terrorists often for political 
reasons and, thereby, excluded from peace processes. 
Empirically, we observe that many countries where 
stabilisation has been attempted are origin countries 
of refugees and migrants. This led to the question 
of whether the military can contribute to a reduc-
tion of violence; is policing a possible alternative to 
current stabilisation practices? What would be an 
effective balance between security and development 
assistance? Further discussions revolved around 
the questions of whether arms control should be a 
major player in stabilisation. The panel ended on the 
unison note that stabilisation assistance needs to be 
very contextual; local actors and their interests have 
to be the focal point.  This requires deep local knowl-
edge to understand what has impeded constructive 
assistance in the past. 
Peter Rudolf pointed out that peacekeeping missions 
are often overburdened by the claim of stabilisation, 
arguing that traditional peacekeeping missions with 
a liberal peacebuilding mandate have a respectable 
working record. Therefore, the usefulness of the term 
stabilisation is not evident, and it should be aban-
doned. Moreover, the gap between stabilisation man-
dates and enforcement is huge. In practice, stabilisa-
tion missions are determined by “Western” interests, 
and UN peacekeeping missions with a stabilisation 
mandate overlap with counter-insurgency opera-
tions. A state-centric bias is pursued in stabilisation 
missions even though the state and predatory elites 
are part of the problem. Consequently, Rudolf stated 
that peacekeeping troops are increasingly becom-
ing part of the conflict, complicit in atrocities and 
are tasked with conflict management that involves 
proactive use of force (violation of UN peacekeep-
ing principles). Rudolf argued that risk assessments 
regarding human rights are necessary. 
Ann L. Phillips outlined that stabilisation missions 
should be regarded as a first step for long-term 
peacebuilding. Regarding a key question of whose 
security and stability is addressed in UN peacekeep-
ing missions, she pointed to ambiguity in UN man-
dates that prioritise the protection of civilians and 
force protection. Given the high threat environments 
in which peacekeepers work today and the diffi-
culty in distinguishing the “enemy” from civilians, 
peacekeepers often default to force protection and 
fail to protect civilians.  Another common ambiguity 
resides in the responsibility to protect the govern-
ment while facilitating a peace process with insur-
gents. Training for dealing with such complex envi-
ronments is often insufficient as well. Thus, Phillips 
called for rethinking realistic expectations for peace-
keepers. As “coalitions of the willing” become more 
prominent in stabilisation missions, the geostrategic 
interests of the stabilisers inform the conception of 
stabilisation interventions. This is inter alia reflected 
in the fact that the stabilising actor has the power to 
decide which local actors are considered legitimate. 
At the same time, Phillips outlined impediments in 
the United Nation’s structure hindering any changes 
recommended in the HIPPO report and implementa-
tion plan to improve peacekeeping of which stabi-
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Security sector reform:  
A transformative long-term process
After inputs by Hugh Blackman, Senior SSR Advisor and Team Lead Gambia 
Project of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)  
and Anne Bennett, Head of the Sub-Saharan Africa Division of DCAF,   
the breakout group discussed several aspects of “Train and equip programmes  
and security sector reform (SSR)”.
Anne Bennett (r.) and Hugh Blackman \ gave insights from different examples of SSR
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From an SSR-perspective, Hugh Blackman in his 
opening input defined the role of stabilisation as 
“buying time and space to allow a political dialogue 
to develop”. He referred to the bridging component 
inherent to the concept of stabilisation and led over 
to practices and means, such as the initial reduc-
tion of violence and necessary engagement with all 
armed forces to induce an immediate deactivation of 
violence. During downstream processes, stabilising 
efforts would include the identification of those to 
be reconciled to build dialogue and initial low-level 
capacity-building at the same time. One major diffi-
culty would include strategic identification of actors 
in institutions to be tasked with responsibility in 
order to achieve a positive outcome.
Anne Bennett gave insights from different exam-
ples of SSR missions in the Sahel during her input. 
She stressed the relevance of considering specific 
contexts within the region when implementing 
SSR measures; namely state fragility, significant 
regional and international strategic interests and 
threats related to violent extremism. She, there-
fore, claimed that SSR needs to be conceptualised 
beyond a state-centric understanding to include 
those multilayered rationalities. Referring to DCAFs 
work, Bennett stressed the necessity of theory-driven 
research on local perceptions and dynamics (e.g. 
local perceptions on “fragility”) to develop suffi-
cient knowledge that can be translated into effective 
policies and programmes. Bennett emphasised that 
stabilisation is meant to guide a long-term process 
that requires a fundamental transformation of insti-
tutions, enabling the state and society to respond to 
the changing nature of risks. 
During the discussion, participants from many 
backgrounds revealed experiences from SSR while 
repeatedly stating that confrontation with a broad 
set of institutions/actors combined with a general 
lack of understanding of mechanisms and relations 
of institutions and practices remains difficult. The 
prominence of civilian oversight over security forces 
was perceived to be essential as well as the incorpo-
ration of human rights and gender aspects in SSR to 
prevent human rights violations.
It was discussed that training and equipping state 
security forces can be counterproductive to stabil-
ity if those forces are not accountable to legitimate 
political authority and present themselves as a secu-
rity threat to the people they were meant to protect. 
While security forces can be trained and equipped 
short-term, successful reform of the security sector 
is usually a long-term endeavour and frequently 
depends on the “ripeness” of a state to adopt reforms 
to be effective. 
Open questions that arose from this discussion 
invited to think ahead. One participant encouraged 
us to question how we actually define the “success” 
of SSR and what can be expected from, let’s say, a 
G5-state’s involvement in stabilising a neighbouring 
country. When further elaborating on definitions of 
“success”, the question arose how to operationalise 
and measure success and sustainability within SSR. 
Another contribution encouraged us to critically 
think of an underlying “theory of change” which 
may provide a framework and basis of analysis for 
SSR’s contribution to sustainable peace and develop-
ment in the long run. Regarding existing difficulties 
within the coordination of varied security forces, it 
was asked how or whether these are addressed by 
different units either from the host country or from 
sending states. 
In sum, stabilisation still seems to be an inconclusive 
concept inasmuch as it oscillates between the short-
term necessities to reduce violence and a long-term 
perspective that requires the challenging transfor-
mation of institutions as part of a holistic approach. 
Future conceptualisations of stabilisation missions 
should acknowledge these interrelated dimensions 
and translate them into profound policies tailored 
to local contexts. If stabilisation is not a status 
quo enterprise, as one participant put it, a central 
problem is that it frequently depends on cooperation 
with status-quo-oriented actors.
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Migration management  
as a means to stabilise European politics
The breakout group “‘Migration Management’ and Humanitarian & Development 
Aid” debated the relationship between stabilisation and migration and  
migration control. Sabine Wenz, Director of the Better Migration Management 
Programme (BMM) of GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), 
Oliver Bakewell, Senior Lecturer at the Global Development Institute at the 
University of Manchester and Matteo de Bellis, Researcher for Asylum and  
Migration at Amnesty International Headquarters, gave opening statements. 
Sabine Wenz (2nd f. l.) \ explained about the Better Migration Management Programme (BMM) 
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Oliver Bakewell explained that migration is often 
portrayed as a problem that needs to be ‘managed’ 
and controlled. The initial focus on the situation of 
refugees has been sidelined by broader concerns, 
namely the containment and the perceived need to 
channel irregular and/or forced migration. Stabili-
sation is one of the tools used to this end. Bakewell 
sees programmes such as the EU Trust Fund for 
Africa (EUTF) or the Better Migration Management 
programme as part of this shifting discourse towards 
stabilisation as a means to contain migration to 
Europe.
Sabine Wenz argued that the BMM aims to improve 
the ability of partner countries on the African conti-
nent to manage migration flows so that they benefit 
of its potential, and she stressed that the BMM 
agenda on migration is not based on the stabilisation 
pillar of the EUTF. She also mentioned that local con-
cepts are often not taken into account when discuss-
ing stabilisation, while programmes like the BMM 
are making an effort to conceptualise and implement 
its measures in coordination with African partner 
institutions.
Matteo de Bellis criticised attempts of ‘migration 
management’ as acts that prioritise migration 
control over the protection of human rights. De 
Bellis argued that instead, stabilisation ought to 
be an instrument that allows maximising human 
rights protection. Current efforts of migration control 
focus on European interests with worrying effects 
on human rights due to the cooperation of European 
governments with autocratic regimes. This under-
mines the EU’s credibility on upholding human 
rights with the effect of losing leverage and being 
subjected to blackmailing by despotic regimes.
Matteo de Bellis (m.) \ argued that stabilisation ought to be an instrument that allows maximising human rights protection
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In the following discussion, there was considerable 
debate about whether migration management is a 
European policy tool and a means to an end to fulfil 
European political interests. Participants agreed that 
migration management is a European concept that 
excludes African perspectives on migration, which 
are often more constructive and considerate of the 
long history and importance of inter-African migra-
tion in particular. They also viewed the implicit goal 
of migration management as an attempt at “stabilis-
ing” Europe, which has witnessed a very heated and 
populist debate over (im)migration in recent years—
the apparent underlying reason for the recent shift 
in public discourse. Yet, even though migration man-
agement is a European concept for European interest, 
it does offer African countries increased bargaining 
power in international politics.
Many of the programmes that are implemented 
under the umbrella of migration management, such 
as the Khartoum Process, the European Trust Fund 
for Africa or BMM, work with despotic or authoritar-
ian regimes, which discussants criticised strongly. 
Practitioners from the development sector argued 
that these programmes neither aim at stabilisation 
nor legitimise authoritarian rulers but are rather 
a tool for development to improve the delivery of 
basic services to nationals and non-nationals in 
the respective countries. Conversely, human rights 
advocates raised the concern that training police 
forces and delivering surveillance technology or 
cooperating with militias has detrimental effects on 
the upholding of human rights. Both sides agreed 
that the blurry concept and often differing under-
standing of stabilisation of the actors involved lead 
to a strong variance on the interpretation, usage and 
Participants \  of the breakout group “Migration management”
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implementation of it. Thus, it must be born in mind 
that definitions of stabilisation differ between every 
single actor involved and their respective viewpoints. 
This point was also taken up in the discussion on 
the relationship between stabilisation and state, 
where it was argued that the concept of stabilisation 
contains an inherent understanding of territoriality. 
Working with non-state actors is often considered 
to be de-stabilising as it undermines the ordering 
framework of Westphalian nation-states and state 
power. Yet, in practice, this often happens. What does 
approaching non-state, regional or local actors then 
mean for stabilisation? Is it a fragmentation of power 
structures and thereby de-stabilises the state as the 
primary, legitimate actor? Or does the focus on state 
actors support the political elite who defends the 
status quo and their own position? 
The debate on managing and containing irregu-
lar migration is also closely tied to the question 
about regular migration flows. The EU’s political 
interest neglects the local perspective on mobility 
and its importance for livelihoods. This aspect was 
not debated in detail, but the effect of new border 
regimes emerging on the African continent that 
might not be in the local or regional interest received 
some attention. Moreover, participants emphasised 
that local perspectives and understandings of mobil-
ity and migration were not sufficiently considered 
in the policy arena, although they are crucial on the 
ground. 
Oliver Bakewell  \ explained that migration is often portrayed as  
a problem that needs to be ‘managed’ and controlled
STABILISATION—FOR WHOM AND TO WHAT ENDS? \  E. MEININGHAUS, K. MIELKE & M. M. MUTSCHLER (EDS.)
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 1 \ 201916 \
Iraq: A success story?
Ekkehard Brose, Special Envoy for Crisis Prevention and Stabilization at the 
German Federal Foreign Office, Erica Gaston, Non-resident Fellow, Global Public 
Policy Institute and Jan Jaap van Osterzee, Head Public Affairs PAX, gave inputs 
and discussed with the participants in the breakout group “Iraq”. 
Ekkehard Brose (2. f. r.) \ argued that the case of Iraq should be considered a relative success
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Erica Gaston opened the session with her research 
perspective on stabilisation and argued that one key 
point to achieving stabilisation is to reduce violent 
conflict and establish law and order. As concerns the 
protection of civilians, the highly fragmented secu-
rity landscape (split into many variations of minor-
ity defence groups, Iraqi national security forces, 
Popular Mobilization Forces and others) and local 
mobilisation of armed groups have to be reduced. 
In the context of a weakening rule of law and state 
control and higher rates of abuses and marginalisa-
tion among the different ethnic groups, DDR, SSR, 
country stabilisation and reconciliation ought to be 
the tools for bringing about/approaching stabilisa-
tion. However, Gaston concluded that the introduc-
tion of such comprehensive programmes depends 
highly on political will, the lack of which can be seen 
as the key obstacle to the stabilisation process. 
In contrast, Ekkehard Brose argued that the case of 
Iraq should be considered a relative success. It had 
been paramount for the Iraqi government to realise—
after the military defeat by Daesh—that the problems 
that had led to the debacle were homemade. Having 
realised this, stabilisation measures after having 
recaptured territories from Daesh were implemented 
with full government support. Brose pointed out that 
UNDP was a major player in this process aiding the 
government to regain legitimacy. National govern-
ments needed to support the stabilisation trust fund 
and similar measures to enable and enhance stabili-
sation. Germany and the United States, in particular, 
had taken a lead role in stabilisation.  
Jan Jaap van Osterzee added a complementing per-
spective by focusing on the social aspect of peace, in 
particular, the importance of social justice and recon-
ciliation. He spoke about the well working cross-sec-
tarian solidarity among the different communities, 
and how stabilisation can potentially serve as a 
connecting component for them. Nevertheless, he 
pointed out that several layers of conflict coexist and 
have to be addressed to achieve long-term stability. 
In particular, the marginalisation of certain seg-
ments of the population (minority groups like  
Yazidi and Christians) is a major cause for conflict 
that needs to be responded to. 
The discussion took up the identified lack of aware-
ness of several conflict layers that need to be dis-
entangled (historical blindness) to reduce the risk 
that stabilising measures exert destabilising effects 
in the long run. It remained an open question when 
stabilisation would actually end and with it the 
responsibility of ‘stabilisers’. Moreover, the partici-
pants also scrutinised whether stabilisation entails 
a new quality as a concept, means or practice. From 
an academic point of view, aiding locally legitimate 
partners would allow circumventing the government 
apparatus. From a political decision-maker’s point of 
view, working with the Iraqi government of which 
parts are known to be primarily rent-seeking, consti-
tutes one of the few options to push-start the stabili-
sation process in the country. Thus, the political will 
of the stabilisers, in this case, supersedes concerns 
about underlying conflict drivers which might not 
bode well for sustainable stability and peace. 
Erica Gaston  \ opened the session with her research perspective on 
stabilisation in Iraq
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Syria: Dilemmas of stabilisation
The Breakout Group, which dealt with the stabilisation efforts in Syria, started 
with inputs from Nona de Jonge, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdulaziz 
Hallaj, Coordinator of the Syria Project at the Common Space Initiative, Beirut, and 
Samer Abboud, Assistant Professor at Villanova University, Pennsylvania. 
Samer Abboud (m.) \ focused on the dilemma that Syria appears to face, that of “illiberal peace”
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The first panellist, Nona de Jonge, reported on a 
Dutch stabilisation project in Syria, which ended 
last summer due to internal political pressure. The 
Durch Foreign Ministry defines stabilisation as 
legitimate stability, i.e. it includes programmes with 
partners who are locally accepted by the population, 
uphold the rule of law, pursue a long-term approach 
and address grievances. The Dutch Foreign Minis-
try has operated in opposition-held areas only. De 
Jonge raised five dilemmas which occur during the 
implementation of stabilisation projects: 1) Which 
non-formal actor should receive support? 2) How 
can such programmes be effectively monitored from 
afar? 3) When stabilisation projects have been imple-
mented, when and how should they be stopped con-
sidering that such programmes inevitably also create 
dependencies? 4) How to best coordinate within 
multi-donor programmes and different approaches 
pursued within each of their support lines? 5) How 
should we balance the political reality on the ground, 
where an autocratic regime is recapturing territory 
where stabilisation programmes have been running, 
often for many years? 
Abdulaziz Hallaj stressed that the reality on the 
ground shows that even the opposition is not a 
homogeneous unit, but highly diverse. The fact that 
foreign governments worked with selected partners, 
thereby often pursuing different, if not conflicting 
agendas, has led to a fragmentation of armed groups 
rather than stabilisation. He further pointed out that 
there are only few well-informed, contextualised 
programmes, and projects often do not continue, 
which has resulted in a lack of connection among 
armed groups. Consequently, the opposition received 
enough support to stay alive, but not enough to be 
able to change the political situation on the ground. 
He stressed that given Syria’s very young population, 
the country—if not the whole region—is headed 
towards a perfect storm by 2030, for which forecasts 
project oil and gas devaluation, trade deficits and a 
bulge of youth unemployment. 
Samer Abboud focused on the dilemma that Syria 
appears to face, that of “illiberal peace”: A military 
defeat of opposition forces whereby an autocratic 
regime stays in place without any accountability for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity commit-
ted over the past decades. Syria will likely not see a 
consensus on political reforms. Thus in such a situ-
ation, what does it mean to “stabilise” when we face 
authoritarian peace? “Liberal peace” is a paradigm 
with set goals; illiberal peace means no political 
process, no reconciliation and continuing violence. 
Indeed, permanent violence and persisting enmity 
are even goals for some parties. 
In the following discussion, participants determined 
that existing coordinated funding lines for stabilisa-
tion programmes do not exhibit any clear logic and 
coordinated goals. Fragmented funding and conflicts 
of interests between donors have effectively fueled 
conflict and weakened opposition forces—armed as 
well as civilian. For the peace process to proceed, par-
ticipants referred to crucial aspects, such as lacking 
attention to human security and reconciliation as 
well as enforced disappearances. In practice, human 
rights questions are forced into the background 
when individuals in Syria face the choice of either 
accessing life-saving medical treatment—which 
is often only available in government-controlled 
areas due to the strategic bombing of hospitals—or 
of pursuing their strife for democracy and human 
rights but forsaking interaction with the regime, 
or regime-held areas. Among many Syrians, such 
decisions reflect a sense of betrayal and desertion by 
the international community, which had voiced its 
support for democratic reform but offered no protec-
tion on the ground. Although stabilisation projects, 
which, e.g. entail technical cooperation, police 
training and support for local communities in build-
ing resilience had temporarily improved the living 
conditions in many areas across the country, these 
were severely weakened by a lack of coordination 
and political will, Russia’s support for the regime/
blocking of the UN Security Council and a regime 
that has proven unwilling to make any concessions. 
Now, the question of the physical safety of current or 
former local partners in stabilisation programmes—
and whether and how aid can be delivered with the 
regime regaining control is confronting locals as well 
as the international community with new, but no 
less tragic choices. 
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Mali: How to operate in an increasingly  
complex and hostile environment?
The Mali breakout group, began with inputs by David Lochhead, formerly United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
Louisa Waugh, Security Governance in the Sahel Expert and Denis Tull,  
Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM). 
Louisa Waugh, David Lochhead and Denis Tull (f. l. t. r.) \ presented on Mali
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 1 \ 2019 21 \
STABILISATION—FOR WHOM AND TO WHAT ENDS? \  E. MEININGHAUS, K. MIELKE & M. M. MUTSCHLER (EDS.)
In his presentation, David Lochhead pointed out 
that key problems in Mali are contested state control 
and trafficking networks. The priorities of stabili-
sation should hence be the control of trafficking 
routes as well as national capacity-building, human 
rights training and border management. As there 
are several security actors active in Mali, it is also 
necessary to raise the question of who wants stability 
and to realise when interests of external actors run 
counter to the needs of the country and its popula-
tion. In practice, coordination mechanisms and a 
common strategy between different security players 
are very important but often not easy to achieve. 
Louisa Waugh noticed that there is, in fact, no clear 
concept of what stabilisation actually means. When 
actors talk about stabilisation, they mainly think 
about peacebuilding. In her view, stability cannot be 
brought from the outside. Crime, violence and insta-
bility (CVI) is part of everyday life in Mali, which 
causes enduring low-intensity conflicts. As the state 
is not able to provide security for the local people 
and its security forces are perceived as even more 
brutal than local armed groups, frequently these very 
groups take up the position of the national forces. 
A concrete and promising approach to civil peace is 
the establishment of civil–military dialogue struc-
tures which aim to build trust between civilians and 
military forces. The local population’s accessibility to 
justice and the prosecution of human rights viola-
tions ought to be part of this micro-level peace-build-
ing process.
Denis Tull gave the last statement. In his view, the 
local context is highly complex, mainly because of 
blurred boundaries between different social groups 
and armed groups in Mali. He noticed that it is also 
important to keep in mind the different perspectives 
on stabilisation between international agencies and 
the Malian government which seems to be unwill-
ing to undertake significant reforms, for example in 
the security sector. Institutional learning is not very 
efficient because past experiences are often ignored 
by the different actors, and human rights protection 
is not given the role it should have. In general, he 
observes a “security actor traffic jam” in Mali. 
In the following discussion, many questions were 
raised. One of the first comments centred on the 
definition of different groups as extremists, terror-
ists or part of social movements. It was stressed that 
not all rebel groups in Mali are terrorists and that 
the label “terrorist” is used inflationary. A further 
question was, how civil and international peace mis-
sions can operate in an increasingly complex and, at 
times, hostile environment where the legitimacy of 
international actors is on a low level among the local 
population? Louisa Waugh noticed that building 
trustful relations with local partner organisations 
is the key to establishing legitimacy. The difficulty 
of UN missions is that they are closely following the 
logic of anti-terrorism campaigns. To reach a level of 
stability, it is important to consider the deeper lying 
causes of instability. Another comment was that 
international actors largely perceive the nation-state 
to be the appropriate governance structure. Local 
perceptions often diverge from this position and 
would favour a less state-centric approach. Finally, 
migration became part of the discussion. The control 
of migration flows and migration management are 
of great interest within the European Union. The 
governments of Mali and other Sahel countries know 
this well and use it as bargaining chip in negotia-
tions with donors.
David Lochhead \ pointed out that key problems in Mali are contested 
state control and trafficking networks
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Conclusion: Stabilisation  
is neither unproblematic nor unpolitical
A “market place” format in the morning and reports to the plenum in the  
afternoon allowed all participants to access the results of the breakout group 
discussions and invited them to compare and further discuss the results.  
In the final Wrap Up, Meininghaus, Mielke and Mutschler aimed to synthesise  
the insights of the day and relate these back to the three sets of guiding questions 
that were set out in the morning. 
Abdulaziz Hallaj \ was input-giver in the breakout group “Syria” 
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The participants were asked to repeat the morning 
poll to observe possible changes in their opinions. 
Indeed, the overall impression of stabilisation was 
now more critical; 44 per cent voted negative, 32 per 
cent positive, and 28 per cent neutral. Opinions in 
the audience reflected a more cautious and nuanced 
attitude to stabilisation than before, because its 
meaning is so diverse, opening the door for all types 
of interest-based interpretations and actions. Our 
joint scrutiny of “stabilisation” as a concept and in 
practice showed to have challenged its perception as 
being “unproblematic” or even “unpolitical”. 
The final reflections on the three sets of questions 
revolved around the following main points: 
What is our understanding  
of stabilisation?  
Who or what is meant to be stabilised, 
and to what ends?
Overall, given the diversity of interpretations, under-
standings and interest-driven implementation strat-
egies undertaken as stabilisation, participants did 
not find any common, all-inclusive definition of sta-
bilisation. They widely agreed that we lack criteria for 
‘successful’ stabilisation. However, they also agreed 
on the smallest common denominator, that is the 
reduction of violence as the discursive and practical 
aim of stabilisation efforts. Especially representatives 
of policy circles and implementers of stabilisation 
programmes claimed to have quite a clear under-
standing of what stabilisation is and what measures 
it entails, but they also admitted that stabilisation 
is contextual and subject to changes. Overall, two 
poles of stabilisation were revealed in the discus-
sions. On the more modest end of the spectrum, 
stabilisation seems to be seen as a bundle of short- to 
medium-term measures to decrease violence, while 
a more ambitious understanding also aims at the 
long-term transformation of societal structures to 
achieve sustainable stability. Who proposes which 
model depends on the professional background of 
the respective proponent.     
How does stabilisation  
work in practice?  
What are the concrete means and 
practices of stabilisation?
Corresponding to the heterogeneous understandings 
of stabilisation, the range of practical implemen-
tation measures is even broader. When it comes 
to implementation, significant contradictions and 
problems between the theory and practice of stabi-
lisation become apparent. One is closely related to 
interest-defined stabilisation policy, e.g. when migra-
tion from Africa to Europe is viewed as a risk to sta-
bility from the Northern perspective but thought to 
be stabilising when viewed from the South. Another 
problem becomes obvious when many donors are 
present in one stabilisation context and create what 
has been called a “stabilisation traffic jam”, and when 
a lack of coordination regarding ends and means of 
stabilisation risks creating an overall destabilising 
impact. The so-called robust UN peacekeeping mis-
sions are another case in point. Here, stabilisation 
mandates are launched without a clear definition of 
either the stabilisation component or the endpoint/ 
success criteria for intervention and without reflect-
Nona de Jonge and Jan Jaap van Oosterzee \ presented in the breakout 
groups “Syria” and “Iraq”
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ing on the implications of the lack of definition for 
the everyday work of the peacekeeping personnel. 
The unclear mandates carry considerable risks, not 
only with regard to the reputation and credibil-
ity of the United Nations when the peacekeeping 
principles get undermined but also to the physical 
security of the personnel and long-term stability of 
the conflict setting they are operating in. Finally, a 
central dilemma consists in the frequent necessity 
to work with non-legitimate regimes and actors to 
initially reduce violence. This collaboration risks 
benefiting these actors and aiding them to sustain 
their power and the status quo, which is often in 
their interest but is detrimental to more profound 
and long-term changes of the local power structures 
which have often led to instability in the first place. 
If stabilisation is “not a status quo enterprise”, as one 
participant put it, it will also have to focus on struc-
tural changes. For example, meaningful SSR and DDR 
programmes would be highly necessary to decrease 
the likelihood of further violent escalations in the 
mid- to long term in Iraq and Mali. 
Does the growing significance  
of stabilisation imply abandoning 
support for democracy and  
human rights, instead focusing on  
the establishment and maintenance  
of order?
Throughout the day, a controversial debate emerged 
among participants discussing this question. While 
the overall impression was that everybody would 
agree that stabilisation aims at supporting human 
rights and democracy, reflections on actual practice 
clearly showed contradictions. In consequence, the 
practical sacrifice of ambitions might well be cap-
tured as consenting to modest motives dominated by 
mere policing objectives as they are manifest in the 
establishment and maintenance of order. However, 
this can be highly problematic, for example when 
the counterinsurgency measures of peacekeeping/
stabilisation missions do not reflect the concerns 
of the local communities and are seen mainly as 
support for a corrupt and illegitimate government. 
In Syria, with the Assad regime ‘winning’ militarily, 
authoritarian peace is around the corner, and donors 
are struggling with how to position themselves. This 
shows that stability cannot be imposed from the 
outside unilaterally but needs to grow bottom-up, 
assisted by external technical support at maximum. 
The often observed contradiction between immediate 
stabilisation measures and long-term non-stabilisa-
tion points to the necessity of employing long-term 
horizons for stabilisation endeavours from the outset 
and the beginning of military and aid interventions. 
For example, serious SSR implies, besides train and 
equip measures, not only human rights training for 
the security forces but also a (re) institutionalisa-
tion of democratic control of the armed forces and 
security organs. In authoritarian settings, this poses 
a challenge because structural change will only be 
realised in the long term whereas there is a risk that 
authoritarian regimes misuse delivered arms and 
hijack training activities. Conditionality in devel-
opment aid was discussed as one measure to tackle 
these challenges.
Elvan Isikozlu \ moderated a wrap up session
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Beyond the three blocks of questions, several  
synthesis messages can be deduced. We suggest that 
these are followed up in further discussion formats 
that involve decision-makers, implementers and 
scholars: 
 \ A number of participants raised the concern 
that stabilisation is an externally imposed 
agenda driven by interests and criteria of 
interveners/stabilisers that usually do not 
comply with the understanding of stabili-
sation of those subjected to these measures. 
‘Local’ concepts of stability and stabilisation 
are disregarded more often than not. The gap 
between stabilisation from outside and inter-
nal (context-evolved) stability is unresolved 
and touches on ethical considerations that 
need to be followed up in future discussions. 
Since stabilisation cannot be imposed from 
outside, the intervention society is objectified 
and any existing understandings of how to 
end violence and mitigate conflict are side-
lined. This must be avoided at all cost.
Wrap up session \ Participants
 \ The observation by several participants that, 
indeed, short-term stabilisation measures do 
not guarantee long-term (however defined) 
stabilisation success calls for a revision of sta-
bilisation policies and enforcement practices 
and an approach that is as comprehensive as 
possible. This requires identifying clear crite-
ria for aims and thus success and the actual 
‘endpoint’ of stabilisation, as well as integrat-
ing understandings of stability and measures 
how to reach these as judged by the society 
that is subject to stabilisation. 
 \ There are different approaches to the question 
as to whether governments should be part-
ners in stabilisation efforts or not. However, 
working with authoritarian regimes at the 
cost of neglecting locally legitimate actors 
should be avoided. Where this is deemed 
unavoidable, stabilisation actors should 
identify strict conditions for intervention/aid 
(i.e. structural changes towards democratic 
governance), fixed timelines and milestones, 
as well as minimum standards (“red lines”). 
The decision whether to (dis-)continue stabi-
lisation programmes should be continuously 
under review. 
STABILISATION—FOR WHOM AND TO WHAT ENDS? \  E. MEININGHAUS, K. MIELKE & M. M. MUTSCHLER (EDS.)
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 1 \ 201926 \
bicc \
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn 
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany 
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de 
www.bicc.de 
www.facebook.com/bicc.de 
Director for Research
Professor Dr. Conrad Schetter 
Director for Administration
Michael Dedek
EDITORS
Dr Esther Meininghaus, Dr Katja Mielke, Dr Max M. Mutschler 
CO-EDITOR 
Susanne Heinke 
COPYEDITOR
Heike Webb
SUPPORT
Kirsten Brinkmann, Luisa Denter, Rahel Lorenz,  
Rupert Neuhöfer, Lena Schellhammer, Ugur Sevindik
DATE OF PUBLICATION
14 February 2019
PHOTOS
Max Meßling \ BICC 
LAYOUT
kippconcept.gmbh, Bonn
CONCEPTION EDITORIAL DESIGN
Diesseits – Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License;  
cf.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
The conference was generously funded by 
the Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung  
(DSF, German Foundation for Peace Research) 
and the Foundation for International  
Dialogue of the Savings Bank in Bonn
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES 1 \ 2019 27 \
STABILISATION—FOR WHOM AND TO WHAT ENDS? \  E. MEININGHAUS, K. MIELKE & M. M. MUTSCHLER (EDS.)

